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Abstract 
The design a typology of policy tools specifically aimed at tourism policy at the local level 
represents the main goal and the original contribution of this paper. Based on market failures 
theory and the tools approach, we analyze the Weimer and Vining’s original typology 
supplemented by an empirical analysis of tourism policy tools adopted by local governments 
in Portugal. This empirical analysis uses a representative sample of 214 Portuguese local 
governments. The results suggest an alignment with Weimer and Vining’s original typology 
but also the existence of specific situations in Portuguese local governments requiring the 
expansion of this typology. Besides that, the intervention by Portuguese local governments in 
tourism relies primarily in the use of direct provision. For most municipalities, direct provision 
is still the main, sometimes the only, set of policy tools employed when addressing tourism 
market failures. 
 
Keywords: market failures; tourism market failures; public policy tools; typology of tourism 
policy tools 
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Introduction 
The evolution of Public Administration, in general, and Public Policy, in particular, has 
recognized that governments have at their disposal a wide range of policy tools, including 
much more than the traditional direct provision of public goods and services (Salamon, 1981, 
2002; Blair, 2002; Weimer and Vining, 2010). In other words, these policy tools are social 
intervention techniques or means of control that governments can use to implement public 
policies (Howlett, 1991, 2005; Vedung, 1998). In this context, the development of the tools 
approach has enabled the design of several public policy typologies, in particular the typology 
presented by Weimer and Vining (2010), which is one of the most important in categorizing 
government interventions to solve market failures (Weiss, 1999). According to this author, 
markets constitute the organizational framework used to understand the causes of public 
problems, so government intervention becomes a substitute of markets forces when the results 
provided by them are not acceptable or when they fail to achieve what welfare economics 
theory describes as Pareto optimal. Thus, this typology corresponds to the context where 
market failures are addressed through government intervention and represents the main 
economic rationale for public sector involvement in private matters (Wolf, 1994; Michael, 
2001; Fleischer and Felsenstein, 2000; Weimer and Vining, 2010).  
 
Given the growing importance of the tools approach, tourism policy interventions can be 
examined in a more systematic way by resorting to the Weimer and Vining typology. In fact, 
tourism activity is clearly inseparable from market context and the literature has pointed out 
that the main reasons for government intervention in the economy are recognized as being 
applicable to tourism activity (Fayos-Solá, 1996; Michael, 2001; Andersson, and Getz, 2009). 
The goal of this paper is to develop a typology of tourism policy tools based on Weimer and 
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Vining’s original typology supplemented by an empirical analysis of tourism policy tools 
adopted by local governments in Portugal.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we contextualize the tourism activity as an imperfect 
market, with a strong presence of public goods, externalities, natural monopolies, and 
asymmetric information and the main policy tools suggested by the literature to solve specific 
problems related with these market failures. Next, we present the context of tourism policies 
in Portuguese local governments. Third, we formulate the main arguments that guided our 
empirical analysis, and present and discuss the exploratory results. Lastly, we introduce our 
revised typology of tourism policy tools followed by a short set of conclusions and 
implications for tourism policy and development in Portugal and elsewhere.  
 
Tourism Market Failures and Public Policy Tools: The Literature  
From an economic point of view, the tourism activity is regarded as an imperfect market, with 
a strong presence of public goods, externalities, natural monopolies and asymmetric 
information (Michael, 2001). The author refers to tourism as an economic activity more 
predisposed than other industries to market failures, because it depends on the output of many 
industries to deliver its own product; this requires some form of public intervention to restore 
the parameters of competition. The standard reasons for public intervention in the economy are 
perfectly applicable to tourism activity (O'Fallon, 1993; Fayos-Sola, 1996). In this sense, the 
following subsections summarize tourism market failures and present key policy tools 
employed to solve inefficiencies caused by these failures.  
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Public Goods 
In the case of pure public goods, i.e., goods characterized by non-rivalry and non-
excludability, it is possible to identify several authors who advocate the existence of tourism 
goods or services with such characteristics: tourism promotion, tourism infrastructures, 
tourism coordination, and tourism planning (Blake and Sinclair, 2007). The promotion of 
national tourism and/or destinations is the most distinct example of a non-rival and non-
exclusive good in the tourism market (Mak and Miklius, 1989). The financial resources used to 
promote a destination will benefit all the companies of such destination, regardless of their 
support for this promotion (non-rivalry). As a result, firms tend to minimize their investments 
on promotion in the expectation that other firms will invest. Any benefits from these 
investments will be shared by all firms in the tourist destination – non-excludability (Cooper 
and Hall, 2008). In other words, if some companies were to advertise their destination 
collectively, other companies would still be able to free ride on this promotion. As a result, no 
firms have the incentive to pursue such a voluntary pattern (Dwyer and Forsyth, 1992, 1993; 
Lundtorp, 2003; Mak, 2004; Hall, 2005; Shi, 2012). Thus, this kind of behavior produces an 
inadequate allocation of economic resources, due to underfunding of tourism promotion (Mak, 
2006). In light of this, it seems to be consensual that tourism promotion requires some form of 
public intervention, since it is extremely difficult to determine accurately who benefits from 
tourism promotion (Bonham and Mak, 1996; Cunha and Abrantes, 2013).  
 
The scientific community recognizes the direct involvement of governments (national, 
regional, and local) in the provision and funding of tourism promotion (Mak and Miklius, 
1989; Mak, 2004; Rigall-I-Torrent, 2008). Despite the importance of this direct public 
intervention, the increase of public budgetary restrictions has led to a set of alternative policy 
tools to public provision and financing of tourism promotion, namely (Cooper and Hall, 2008; 
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Hall, 2008): i) forcing businesses to pay a funding levy; “user pays”/cooperative funding 
systems; tax on foreign exchange earnings; tax on tourism investment; and a commercial bed 
tax, among others. Nonetheless, several authors continue to advocate that the most 
appropriated policy tool is direct intervention and public funding of tourism promotion 
(Bonham and Mak, 1996; Cooper and Hall, 2008; Hall, 2008). This can be justified by three 
arguments. First, it is difficult to capture the benefits of tourism promotion activities due to the 
fragmented nature of tourism activity. Second, the alternative tools will reinforce the free rider 
problem, according to which firms that do not support financially tourism promotion will 
benefit as much as cooperating firms. Finally, the benefits of tourism promotion are scattered 
throughout the community. 
 
The provision of tourism infrastructures is another example of a public good (Perry, 2003; 
Wanhill, 2005; Sakai, 2006). Given the concepts of infrastructure and tourism superstructure1, 
it is obvious that they represent an important part of the tourism product and therefore require 
provision in order to increase the competitiveness of tourist destinations (Dwyer and Kim, 
2003). However, despite the fact that the private sector guarantees the provision of some 
infrastructures, it has no incentive to provide infrastructures with public good characteristics, 
particularly those that are non-excludable (Blake and Sinclair, 2007). In this sense, the 
efficient level of provision of tourism infrastructures requires some form of government 
intervention. For instance, the scientific community identifies several policy tools that may be 
used: direct provision; public and private capital co-financing; financial and fiscal incentives; 
and taxation of tourism infrastructures (Bird, 1992; Jamieson, 2001; Jeffries, 2001; Benner, 
2013). Nevertheless, and despite the diversity of these tools, some authors insist that the 
                                                
1 The literature distinguishes between tourism infrastructure and tourism superstructure. Tourism infrastructure “covers the subordinate 
facilities, equipment, systems and processes that provide a foundation for a wide range of economic needs”. “The tourism superstructure 
represents the additionally created assets which rest upon this infrastructure and which serve visitor-oriented needs and desires” (Ritchie and 
Crouch, 2003: 21).       
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efficient level of provision of tourism infrastructures results from direct government 
intervention (Perry, 2003; Wanhill, 2005; Sakai, 2006; Blake and Sinclair, 2007). 
 
The co-ordination of tourism activity represents another form of public good (Blake and 
Sinclair, 2007). Tourism is an extremely complex activity that brings together a wide range of 
activities and products and involves a large number of public and private actors (Jeffries, 
2001). Due to this significant fragmentation, it is very common to find co-ordination 
problems in tourism activities. The lack of co-ordination is a phenomenon so characteristic of 
tourism activity (Jamal and Getz, 1995; Okazaki, 2008), which often occurs an unplanned 
way and without any institutional arrangement (Hall, 2008). At the same time, this co-
ordination if performed by private actors would be non-excludable and therefore companies 
could benefit by free riding on the benefits provided by others (Blake and Sinclair, 2007; 
Hall, 208). Thus, the development of policy tools aims to achieve co-ordination between 
various public actors of different levels of government, between public and private actors, and 
also among private actors (Jamal and Getz, 1995; Fayos-Sola, 1996; Candela and Figini, 
2012; Cunha and Abrantes, 2013). In this regard, the literature unanimously recognizes the 
important action of co-ordination taken up by national, regional, and local governments 
(Jamal and Getz, 1995; Benner, 2013). Hall (2008) considers co-ordination as a political 
activity and therefore can be extremely difficult to achieve, especially in the case of tourism, 
due to the large number of actors involved in the decision-making process. In this case, it is 
impossible to accomplish co-ordination without government intervention (Fayos-Sola, 1996). 
Jamal and Getz (1995), Fernandes and Sousa (2002) and Benner (2013) refer that public 
actors should definitely adopt a common view of tourism development involving the 
participation of the most relevant public and private stakeholders. The authors also consider 
several types of policy tools to mitigate the co-ordination problem, namely: direct provision; 
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co-ordination structures created by government that operate closer to the market logic; and co-
ordination structures totally independent of public power.  
 
Underlying this co-ordination problem, tourism planning2 also possesses public good features 
(Choy, 1991; Costa, 2001). Although short-term tourism development may be attractive, this 
process should result from medium and long term planning, in order to maximize the potential 
of investments and avoid possible negative impacts (Hall, 2008). Given that the interrelations 
and interdependencies with various sectors of activity produce a highly fragmented activity, 
tourism planning cannot be provided by private firms alone (Mason, 2003; Cunha and 
Abrantes, 2013). Firms also develop planning exercises in tourism, but with goals targeted at 
profit or return on investments, which do not correspond to the goals of planning by public 
entities (Mason, 2003). In this sense, many governments have taken up an active role in 
tourism planning, adopting plans at the national, regional and/or local levels dedicated 
exclusively to tourism (Bramwell and Sharman, 1999; Dredge, 2001; Simpson, 2001; Hall, 
2005).  
 
Externalities 
Due to its importance and magnitude, tourism activity generates a vast number of impacts, 
which the literature commonly describes as externalities or external effects (Mathieson and 
Wall, 1982; Ap and Crompton, 1998; Candela and Figini, 2012). An externality represents 
either a benefit or a cost being incurred by a third party due to a decision made by two parties 
involved in a voluntary transaction (Blake and Sinclair, 2007). In other words, such cost or 
benefit is not transmitted through the price mechanism (Schubert, 2010; Tribe, 2011). In this 
sense, the external effects of tourism activity are likely to be either positive or negative and 
                                                
2 Given the complementarity of co-ordination and planning activities, we choose to address these forms of public good in conjunction.  
 8 
usually are categorized as economic, socio-cultural or environmental effects (Mathieson and 
Wall, 1982; Biagi and Detotto, 2012; Sharpley, 2014). The external effects caused by tourism 
activity create differences between the private optimum and the social optimum, thus 
requiring some form of government intervention in order to internalize those effects 
(Schubert, 2010). Generally, the scientific community suggests two groups of policy 
solutions. The first group assumes that governments can take an active role in the market 
through direct control, regulating the tourism activity, or indirect control, by changing the cost 
structure through price-based policy mechanisms. Such policy tools can take the form of taxes 
or subsidies (Candela and Figini, 2012). Despite some differences, various authors have 
pointed out the use of Pigouvian taxes as the most efficient solution to address the problems 
caused by externalities (Palmer and Riera, 2003; Piga, 2003; Liang and Wang, 2010; 
Pazienza, 2011; Rinaldi, 2012). Besides the internalization of external effects, these taxes 
generate higher revenues governments may use to provide infrastructures and new services 
for residents (Rinaldi, 2012). In turn, the second group of policy tools assumes a completely 
different solution to correct external effects. According to the Coase Theorem, with clearly 
defined property rights and negligible transactions costs, externalities can be corrected 
through market mechanisms, as long as both assumptions prevail (Candela, Castellani and 
Dieci, 2008; Hojman and Hiscock, 2010). Therefore, government’s actions should be limited 
to the definition of property rights in order to allow economic agents to achieve efficient 
solutions to the externality problem (Jensen and Wanhill, 2002; Candela, Castellani and 
Dieci, 2008; Santos, 2012).  
 
Natural Monopoly 
The third tourism market failure discussed is commonly referred as natural monopoly. A 
natural monopoly occurs when an industry has economies of scale throughout its relevant 
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extension of production, so that the average costs are lower when a single firm produces for 
the entire market (Baumol, 1977; Santos, 2012). In this context, competition between firms is 
considered socially undesirable, since the existence of various firms will result in the 
unnecessary multiplication of investments. It is more efficient that market demand is satisfied 
by a single producer (Santos, 2012). Several authors indicate the presence of natural 
monopolies in tourism activity (Veal, 2003, 2006; Sakai, 2006; Tribe, 2011). The main 
argument focuses on characteristics of tourist attractions, particularly its scarcity, uniqueness, 
immobility, and regional differences, which result in natural monopoly situations (Veal, 2003, 
2006; Liang and Wang, 2010). In other words, the “iconic” nature of many tourism products, 
in terms of typology and quality of tourist attractions, suggest the presence of a natural 
monopoly (Forsyth and Dwyer, 2002; Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2005). As mentioned by 
Veal (2003; 2006) there can only be one Parthenon, one Niagara Falls, one London Tower, 
one Grand Canyon and one Eiffel Tower, which are all described as social monopolies. This 
author emphasize that leisure organizers can take advantage of the natural monopoly, making 
use of historical advantage of such tourist attractions. Generally, natural monopolies create 
two major problems: excessive profit, to the disadvantage of the consumer, and limitation of 
supply (Veal, 2003, 2006; Liang and Wang, 2010). In these situations, some form of 
government intervention is required in order to avoid the exploitation of monopolistic 
advantage by private agents. Veal (2006) points out the governmental control and ownership 
of these types of tourist attractions, also considering economic regulation as a useful 
alternative to monopoly power (Liang and Wang, 2010). In turn, Gooroochrun and Sinclair 
(2005) also suggest the use of taxation to alter the incorrect allocation of resources.  
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Asymmetric Information 
The last well-known form of tourism market failure is asymmetric information. In this 
context, tourism has been widely described as a market prone to information asymmetries 
(Crase and Jackson, 2000; Smeral, 2006; Schwartz, 2007). Information asymmetry means that 
tourism firms may provide false information or conceal disadvantage factors to damage 
tourist benefits (Liang and Wang, 2010). Usually, this leads to adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems (Liang and Wang, 2010). The fragmented nature of tourism market and the 
separation between the origin of tourism firms and tourist destinations, it can be expected that 
information asymmetries will be felt with great intensity (Caccomo and Solonandrasana, 
2001; Cunha, 2006). According to Baggio and Baggio (2011), as tourists cannot test the 
product before buying it, they are not able to assess its quality in full and the decision to buy 
will be based on incomplete information made available by providers and intermediaries. 
Under information asymmetry, market adjustment mechanisms fail to take effect, justifying 
the intervention of governments in the regulation of information provided to tourists (Chen, 
Mak and Li, 2013). Indeed, governments may carry out quality grade standards for tourist 
attractions and other normative criteria, such as official hotel classification systems as one of 
the best examples of this type of policy (Clerides, Nearchou and Pashardes, 2008; Núñez-
Serrano, Turrion and Velázquez, 2014). In addition, Nicolau and Sellers (2010) suggest the 
definition of quality standards resulting from certification processes by non-governmental and 
specialized agencies as another set of tools to reduce the negative effects of asymmetric 
information in tourism activities. Liang and Wang (2010) suggest that governments can 
provide tourism information directly through their own structures and/or encourage private 
agents to assist in the dissemination of such information (Clerides, Nearchou and Pashardes, 
2008). Finally, several authors emphasize other forms of public intervention, such as the use 
of information and communication technologies and the Internet as useful tools in the 
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dissemination of tourist information (Fernández-Barcala, González-Diaz and Prieto-
Rodriguez, 2010). 
 
In summary, a large body of work is consensual about the existence of market failures in 
tourism markets. Most scholars suggest that government intervention is crucial to improve 
resource allocation in tourism markets, and several policy tools appear as possible solution to 
accomplish this goal. Next, we present the context of tourism policies in local governments in 
Portugal. 
 
The Context of Tourism Public Policy in Portuguese Local Governments   
Historically, local governments in Portugal have assumed an important role in this policy 
area. The current Basic Law of Tourism Public Policies (Law-Decree 191/2009, August 17) 
identifies local authorities (including municipalities) as public tourism agents along with other 
national and regional authorities. Indeed, municipalities are local entities with responsibilities 
in planning, development and implementation of tourism policies, whose role is to promote 
tourism development through coordination and integration of public and private initiatives in 
order to achieve the goals of the National Strategic Plan for Tourism (article 1.1 and 2). 
Another source that corroborates the importance of Portuguese municipalities in tourism 
policy is the document that establishes the legal framework transferring competences from the 
national government to local governments (Law 69/2015, July 16). Competencies related to 
rural and urban infrastructures, energy, transport, heritage, culture, among others, are just a 
few examples of competences that are connected, directly or indirectly, to tourism. In this 
sense, Costa (1998: 209) and the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities (2004: 6) 
defined a set of strategic areas in tourism where municipalities can play an active role, 
namely: i) To create or participate in local institutions aiming at the promotion of tourism; ii) 
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To build infrastructures of interest to tourism and local communities, ensuring, for example, 
water supply, sewage, and refuse collection; iii) To develop tourism planning strategies; iv) 
To co-ordinate tourism activity, integrating other institutions with direct or indirect interest; 
v) To assess economic, sociocultural, and environmental tourism effects; vi) To provide 
tourism information.  
 
In this regard, many strategic areas of municipal intervention are related to tourism market 
failures already documented in the previous section and local governments in Portugal play an 
important role in addressing these market failures. Next, we formulate the main arguments 
that guide the empirical analysis of policy tools employed by local governments in Portugal to 
mitigate tourism market failures.  
 
Tourism Policy Tools in Portuguese Local Governments  
The goal of this paper is to develop a typology of tourism policy tools based on Weimer and 
Vining’s original typology. In order to achieve this goal, we employ an empirical analysis of 
tourism policy tools adopted by local governments in Portugal, which is based on a set of 
theoretical arguments presented below. As we noticed, the previous section enables us to 
contextualize tourism market failures in Portuguese municipalities (Costa, 1998; National 
Association of Portuguese Municipalities, 2004). In addition, other studies suggest that local 
governments in Portugal actively engage in the direct provision of public goods and services 
(Rodrigues Tavares and Araújo, 2012). Given this background, we consider reasonable to 
argue that municipalities display an active role in addressing tourism market failures.  
 
The literature shows that nonmarket mechanisms are relevant policy tools to solve all market 
failures, perhaps with the exception of tourism externalities. However, this is not surprising if 
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we consider that typology presented by Weimer and Vining (2010) provides as primary 
solution, for externalities, the use of regulation and subsidies and taxes. In fact, and in the case 
of tourism public goods, the use of nonmarket mechanisms meeting a greater consensus 
between scientific community. In particular example of tourism promotion, several authors 
argue that the most appropriate way to promote a tourism destination is through direct 
intervention and public funding (Mak and Miklius, 1989, Bonham and Mak, 1996; Mak, 2004, 
2006). In a similar way, it is also argued that the provision and funding of tourism 
infrastructures should be a public sector initiative (Jamieson, 2001; Sakai, 2006; Blake and 
Sinclair, 2007). Finally, and despite the reference to other policy tools, it is more appropriate 
that tourism coordination/planning is carried out through direct government intervention 
(Fayos-Sola, 1996; Jeffries, 2001). Given the demands and complex nature of tourism 
activities, we argue that only governments are able to assume a coordinating, planning, 
facilitator and integrator role of all relevant public and private actors (Fayos-Sola, 1996; 
Cooper and Hall, 2008; Benner, 2013). In this regard, we expect that nonmarket mechanisms 
are used most frequently in the resolution of problems associated with tourism public goods.   
 
Related to tourism externalities, much of the literature points out that the most common and 
simplest policy tool is the use of taxes or subsidies in tourist industry and/or visitors. Blake 
and Sinclair (2007) and Gooroochurn and Sinclair (2005) state that regulation and market 
mechanisms are not the most efficient solutions because they fail to target the source of the 
problem. The authors defend the use of Pigouvian taxes is more efficient, since it allows the 
effective resolution of the situation and not just its remediation. In this sense, we argue that 
Portuguese local governments employ this type of taxes aiming to internalize the costs of 
tourism activity.  
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Lastly, concerning information asymmetry in tourism, regulation constitutes a primary solution 
proposed by Weimer and Vining (2010). However, and considering not only the importance of 
direct provision of tourism information as another possible policy tool, but also the limited 
competences of Portuguese local governments in the regulation of tourism information, we 
expect that local governments are involved directly in the provision of tourism information 
through nonmarket mechanisms. 
 
Given these arguments, we defined a multi-methods research plan, using questionnaires and 
interviews as data collection techniques to help achieve the main goal of this paper. 
Specifically, based on information gathered from interviews3, we created and applied a 
questionnaire to the 308 Portuguese municipalities and obtained a response rate close to 70% 
(214 municipalities). The next section presents and discusses the results. For each tourism 
market failure, we defined a set of policy tools divided by several groups inspired by the 
Weimer and Vining typology. For each group, we added all the policy tools mentioned by the 
municipalities and divided them by the number of policy tools in each group to obtain the 
average value use for each group, thus allowing comparisons between groups of policy tools.    
 
Empirical Analysis  
Concerning tourism promotion, the results show that local governments in Portugal opt 
primarily for nonmarket mechanisms (see Table 1). On average, 166 municipalities out of 214 
marked this group of policy tools. In fact, these results seem to confirm the theoretical 
argument that tourism promotion activities should be primarily ensured by local governments 
through direct provision and public financing to avoid the free-rider problem (Mak and 
Miklius, 1989; Rigall-I-Torrent, 2008). In addition, it is also important to notice that these 
                                                
3 We conducted 16 interviews in Portuguese municipalities, involving a total of 23 interviewees.  
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results suggest an addition to the typology of tourism policy tools. As we can see, regulation 
represents a new group of policy tools added to our typology. As a unique set of policies, 
regulation complements the group of nonmarket mechanisms and characterizes a specific 
situation of Portuguese local governments.  
 
The use of market mechanisms by a few municipalities, an alternative policy tool to public 
financing of tourism promotion, is not, according several authors, the most appropriate 
solution for this type of market failure. This option may be the outcome of budgetary 
restrictions in Portugal’s local government setting, as suggested by Mak (1996) in other 
contexts, or possibly indicate the existence of greater collaboration between private agents and 
Portuguese local governments. However, this solution may fail to solve the free rider problem. 
Only a mandatory participation system with the creation of “tourism promotion market”, as 
proposed by Blake and Sinclair (2007), could solve or minimize the fact that some agents who 
do not contribute financially to the tourism promotion still benefit from such promotion.  
 
Table 1. Tourism Policy Tools, Tourism Promotion 
Policy tools of tourism promotion: Policy tools groups Average value use* [N= 214] 
Municipal budget for tourism promotion 
Nonmarket mechanisms 
166 
(165+184+207+100+ 
168+161+178)/7 
European Union funds  
Preparation of promotional materials   
Tourism brand 
Participation in national tourism promotion fairs  
Participation in international tourism promotion fairs 
Logistical support to private local actors in the 
different promotional activities  
Tourism marketing plan 
Regulation 
58 
(36+80)/2 Plan for tourism promotion 
Tourism promotion funding by private local actors Market mechanisms 
46 
(46/1) 
* The average value use of policy tools groups is rounded to the unit and results from the sum of municipalities that indicate the policy tools 
of tourism promotion, divided by the number of items in each policy tools group. 
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In the case of tourism infrastructures, Portuguese municipalities selected nonmarket 
mechanisms as the primary set of policies, closely followed by the use of subsidies and taxes 
(see Table 2). In general, the results support the literature stating that provision and financing 
of tourism infrastructures should be secured directly by governments (Perry, 2003; Wanhill, 
2005; Sakai, 2006; Blake and Sinclair, 2007). We also confirm prior findings of the literature 
that taxes and subsidies are employed by a considerable number of municipalities and should 
be used as complementary policy tools, or secondary solutions, in the perspective of Weimer 
and Vining (2010).  
 
Table 2. Tourism Policy Tools, Tourism Infrastructures  
Policy tools of development of tourism 
infrastructures: Policy tools groups 
Average value use* 
[N= 214] 
Municipal budget for tourism infrastructures 
Nonmarket mechanisms 
 
European Union funds 
121 
(148+191+86+105+74)/5 
Banking protocols with financial institutions  
Structure to support promoter of tourism 
investment  
Preparation and provision of guidelines to support 
promoter of tourism investment 
Financial incentives  
Subsidies and taxes 111 
(76+92+88+188)/4 
Fiscal incentives  
Charging of entry fees   
Charging of infrastructures fees  
* The average value use of each group of policy tools is rounded to the unit and results from the sum of municipalities that indicate the 
policy tools of development of tourism infrastructures, divided by the number of items in each group of policy tools. 
 
The results related to tourism coordination/planning are also worth mentioning. Table 3 shows 
that regulation is the most widely used group of policy tools to address this market failure. In 
fact, nonmarket mechanisms are scarcely used by municipalities. These findings partially 
contradict the main arguments by tourism scholars. Since tourism coordination/planning have 
public good characteristics, the main policy tool referenced to minimize the effects of this 
market failure consists in direct government intervention (Fayos-Sola, 1996; Jeffries, 2001). In 
contrast, we find that Portuguese municipalities prefer market mechanisms as policy tools to 
solve coordination/planning failures. The absence of specific structures oriented towards the 
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coordination of tourism activities, reflected by the reduced average value use of nonmarket 
mechanisms (36), partly explains the difficulty that Portuguese municipalities have in 
coordinating a diverse set of tourism stakeholders. In this sense, it seems reasonable that 
regulation (through planning) constitutes the most widely used set of policy tools to address 
coordination/planning problems. Furthermore, the coordination of activities is performed by 
municipalities focusing its political action in the development of plans and without specific 
structures created to that effect. In similar way to tourism infrastructures, the results of tourism 
coordination/planning do not reveal any specific situation in Portuguese local governments 
that can contribute to the improvement of our typology of tourism policy tools.   
 
Table 3. Tourism Policy Tools, Tourism Co-ordination/Planning  
Policy tools of tourism co-ordination/planning: Policy tools groups Average value use* [N= 214] 
Co-ordination advisory body involving the participation 
of public and private actors 
Nonmarket mechanisms 36 
(24+67+16)/2 
Oriented co-ordination structure involving the 
participation of public and private actors 
Co-ordination structures created by government that 
operate closer to the market logic  
Co-ordination structures totally independent of public 
power 
Market mechanisms 
53 
(53/1) 
Tourism Development Plan/Strategic Plan 
Municipal Master Plan 
Regulation 86 
(68+103)/2 
* The average value use of each group of policy tools is rounded to the unit and results from the sum of municipalities that indicate the 
policy tools of tourism co-ordination/planning, divided by the number of items in each group of policy tools. 
With regard to the adoption of plans dedicated to tourism activities, we conducted an 
additional analysis testing the existence of differences between the types of plans preferred by 
municipalities of different sizes4. According to the results in Table 4, and assuming a 
significance level of 10%, we find statistically significant differences in preferences for 
different plans. Indeed, large municipalities5 favor the development of plans specifically 
oriented towards tourism (Strategic Plans), whereas small and medium size municipalities 
                                                
4 We conducted a similar analysis to all other tourism market failures, but only the results related to tourism plans reveal statistically 
significant differences.   
5 We adopted a classification suggested by Carvalho, Fernandes, Camões e Jorge (2013), separating Portuguese municipalities into three 
independent samples, depending on their size in terms of population, namely: small size – with population less or equal to 20 000 inhabitants, 
medium size – with population greater than 20,000 inhabitants and less than or equal to 100 000 inhabitants; and large size – with 
populations greater than 100,000 inhabitants. We employ a nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test to compare these independent samples. 
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prefer to integrate tourism activities in their General Master Plans. This situation is hardly 
surprising, considering the structures, interests and impacts of tourism activities in large 
municipalities. In addition, it is also not surprising that small and medium sized municipalities 
elect the Municipal Master Plan as the key planning policy tool for tourism. These results can 
also be explained because, contrary to the longer tradition of Municipal Master Plans, 
Tourism Strategic Plans are a relatively recent policy tool for most municipalities. In short, 
the Municipal Master Plan is the main policy tool employed in the context of tourism 
coordination/planning.  
 
Table 4. Kruskal-Wallis Test Results for Three Samples, Tourism Planning 
Types of Plans:** 
Municipality size in terms of 
population *** Total 
[N=213] Kruskal-Wallis Small 
[n=119] 
Medium 
[n=76] 
Large 
[n=18] 
Average value use *   
Tourism Development Plan/Strategic Plan 30 28 10 68 chi-square 
df 
p-value 
5.268 
2 
0.072 
Municipal Master Plan 62 34 7 103 
Total 92 62 17 171 
* The average value use of policy tools groups has been rounded to the unit and result from the sum of absolute frequencies, divided by the 
number of actions, according to the size of municipalities. 
** Types of plans, is a nominal variable of two categories: 1 – Tourism Development Plan/Strategic Plan; 2 – Municipal Master Plan. 
*** Municipality size in terms of population, is an ordinal variable of three categories: 1 – small; 2 – medium; 3 – large. 
 
In sum, these results reveal that local governments in Portugal play a very active role in the 
provision of tourism promotion and infrastructures, displaying a somewhat lesser role in 
tourism coordination/planning.  
 
Our argument concerning the use of policy tools to correct negative externalities from tourism 
is strongly rejected. The results presented in Table 5 show that local governments in Portugal 
prefer the regulation of negative externalities rather than the use of subsidies and taxes. These 
results seemingly contradict the theoretical arguments present in the literature. Even though 
regulation constitutes a political action recognized by the academics and practitioners in the 
field of tourism policy, the most commonly used policy tool is by far the adoption of taxes to 
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tourism industry and/or visitors, especially in areas where the intensity of tourism activity is 
more evident (Palmer and Riera, 2003; Rinaldi, 2012). The results confirm the conclusions of 
a study presented by Portugal’s Tourism Confederation (2013) pointing out that, contrary to 
what happens in many European countries, Portugal has failed to adhere to tourism taxes. 
Despite the controversies regarding to this kind of taxation, the literature argues that if tax 
design is properly and effectively implemented it can contribute to improve social welfare.  
 
Besides that, it is also important to notice that these results suggest the need for revising the 
typology of tourism policy tools. According to the information obtained from our interviews, 
nonmarket mechanisms represent another group of policy tools employed to address negative 
externalities. Elected officials and managers interviewed suggest the use of direct provision in 
the internalization of negative external effects, such as reinforcing the collection of municipal 
solid waste, cleaning beaches and recreational areas, creating logistical support, among others.  
 
Table 5. Tourism Policy Tools, Negative Tourism Externalities  
Policy tools to mitigate negative tourism externalities: Policy tools groups Average value use* [N= 214] 
Charging of entry fees   
Subsidies and taxes 10 
(17+15+1+7)/4 
Charging of infrastructures fees  
Charging tourist fees (overnight rate) 
Charging fees to local tourism industry 
Regulations and/or municipal ordinances Regulation 
60 
(60/1) 
* The average value use of groups of policy tools groups is rounded to the unit and results from the sum of municipalities that indicate policy 
tools to mitigate negative externalities divided by the number of items in each group of policy tools. 
 
 
Our last argument relates to policy tools used to overcome information asymmetry in the 
market for tourism. The results suggest that municipalities opt for direct provision in the 
preparation and dissemination of tourism information rather than hybrid forms (Table 6). 
These results are consistent with the theoretical arguments present in the literature (Clerides, 
Nearchou and Pashardes, 2008; Liang and Wang, 2010). 
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Table 6. Tourism Policy Tools, Tourism Information Asymmetry  
Policy tools of disclosure of tourism information: Nonmarket mechanisms Average value use* [N= 214] 
Additional tourist offices distributed by major 
points of tourist interest 
Municipal tourist office  
Direct provision 
164 
(128+169+151+199+208+ 
190+194+195+99+185+211+ 
37)/12 
Tourist guides 
Tourist maps 
Tourist brochures 
Tourist circuits 
Tourist information in foreign languages 
Tourist signposting  (directional and information 
signs) 
Information and communication technologies in 
tourism 
Virtual social networks  
Institutional website 
Tourism institutional website 
Non municipal tourist office 
Hybrid forms 60 
(58+71+73+38)/4 
Official network of tourist information involving 
private local tourist actors   
Official network of tourist information involving 
public local tourist actors   
Official network of tourist information involving 
non tourist actors   
* The average value use of policy tools groups has been rounded to the unit and result from the sum of municipalities that indicate the policy 
tools of disclosure of tourism information, divided by the number of items in each category of nonmarket mechanisms 
 
Lastly, the results concerning situations of natural monopoly in tourism activities do not allow 
a definitive conclusion about the preferences of Portuguese local governments. The 
information collected from the questionnaires reveals that municipalities mentioned their 
main tourist attraction(s) rather than situations where natural monopolies were present. 
However, the information obtained in the interviews also suggests that municipalities employ 
market mechanisms as a group of policy tools to address natural monopoly situations.  
 
Table 7 displays a new typology of tourism policy tools to correct a set of standard market 
failures in tourism markets. This typology was inspired by Weimer and Vining’s original 
contribution and updated based on prior findings present in the literature and our own findings 
obtained from an empirical study of Portuguese local governments. Column 2 includes all 
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policy tools presented by the literature to solve tourism market failures. Column 3 includes 
the policy tools employed by Portuguese local governments and identified in our empirical 
study. Column 4 presents a comprehensive typology of tourism policy tools resulting from all 
the contributions identified.  
 
Conclusions and Future Research  
The adoption of tourism policy tools in Portuguese local governments is closely aligned with 
Weimer and Vining’s typology and with most tourism policies reported in the literature. 
However, local governments also display some innovative elements, which distinguish them 
from conventional practices. For some market failures, the policy tools used by Portuguese 
municipalities suggest a revision and upgrade of tourism policy tools present in the literature. 
This revision involves the inclusion of regulation for tourism promotion, the use of nonmarket 
mechanisms to address negative externalities, and the option for market mechanisms to solve 
natural monopoly situations. Furthermore, our study suggests that the intervention by 
Portuguese municipalities in tourism markets relies primarily in the use of direct provision. For 
most municipalities, direct provision is still the main, sometimes the only, set of policy tools 
employed when addressing tourism market failures. In this sense, the next logical step in this 
research agenda is to investigate the relationship between these policy tools and the 
development of local tourism. Local initiatives to encourage tourism development are related 
to the mitigation of tourism market failures. Future work will explore this relationship 
attempting to identify which policy tools provide the greatest contribution to the development 
of local tourism. 
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Table 7. Tourism Market Failures and Public Policy Tools 
Market Failures 
(1) 
Tourism Public Policy Tools 
(2)  
 Portuguese Local Governments 
(3) 
Typology of Tourism Policy Tools 
(4) 
    
Tourism public goods    
Tourism promotion 
Direct provision of tourism promotion Direct provision of tourism promotion Direct provision of tourism promotion 
Taxes charged to tourism activities  Taxes charged to tourism activities Taxes charged to tourism activities 
Financial participation by private agents  ------ Financial participation by private agents 
----- Tourism marketing plan and Plan for tourism promotion 
Tourism marketing plan and Plan for tourism 
promotion 
Tourism infrastructures 
Direct provision of tourism infrastructures Direct provision of tourism infrastructures Direct provision of tourism infrastructures 
Financial incentives 
Fiscal incentives  
Tourist taxes 
Users charges or entry fee 
Financial incentives 
Fiscal incentives  
Tourist taxes 
Users charges or entry fees 
Financial incentives 
Fiscal incentives  
Tourist taxes 
Users charges or entry fees 
Tourism co-
ordination/planning 
Direct provision of co-ordination/planning  
Co-ordination structures created by government that operate 
closer to market logic 
Direct provision of co-ordination/planning  
Co-ordination structures created by government 
that operate closer to market logic 
Direct provision of co-ordination/planning  
Co-ordination structures created by government that 
operate closer to market logic 
Co-ordination structures totally independent of public entities Co-ordination structures totally independent of public entities 
Co-ordination structures totally independent of public 
entities 
Tourism activity plans Tourism activity plans Tourism activity plans 
    
Tourism externalities     
Positive/negative 
Regulation of tourism activities Regulation of tourism activities  Regulation of tourism activities 
Tourist taxes Tourist taxes Tourist taxes 
Definition of property rights  ------ Definition of property rights 
----- Direct provision Direct provision 
    
Natural monopoly in 
tourism activity 
context 
Direct provision of tourist attractions with natural monopoly 
characteristics 
Direct provision of tourist attractions with natural 
monopoly characteristics 
Direct provision of tourist attractions with natural 
monopoly characteristics 
Price regulation  Price regulation  Price regulation 
Taxation of profits of private agents Taxation of profits of private agents Taxation of profits of private agents 
----- Absence of regulation or direct provision Absence of regulation or direct provision 
    
Tourism information 
asymmetry 
Direct provision of tourism information  
Official network of tourist information (hybrid forms) 
Direct provision of tourism information  
Non municipal tourist office (hybrid forms) 
Official network of tourist information involving 
private local tourist agents (hybrid forms) 
Direct provision of tourism information  
Non municipal tourist office (hybrid forms) 
Official network of tourist information (hybrid 
forms) 
Official network of tourist information involving 
private local tourist agents (hybrid forms) 
Regulation of tourism information (by governments) ------ Regulation of tourism information (by governments) 
Regulation of tourism information (by private agents) ------ Regulation of tourism information (by private agents) 
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